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This paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa. We 
hypothesize that corruption and shadow economy are substitutes in high income countries 
while they are complements in low income countries. The hypotheses are tested for a cross-
section of 120 countries and a panel of 70 countries for the period 1994-2002. Our results 
show that the shadow economy reduces corruption in high income countries, but increases 
corruption in low income countries. We also find that stricter regulations increase both 
corruption and the shadow economy. 
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As corruption and shadow economy activities are a fact of life around the world, most 
societies attempt to control their activities through various measures like punishment, 
prosecution, or education. To gather information about the extent of corruption and the 
shadow economy or who is engaged in corrupt or underground activities, the frequencies with 
which these activities are occurring, and the magnitude of them is thus crucial for making 
effective and efficient decisions. Unfortunately, neither corruption nor the shadow economy 
easily lend themselves to measurement. It is thus rather difficult to get correct information 
about the extent of corruption and shadow economy activities in the goods and labour market, 
because all individuals engaged in those activities wish not to be identified, of course. Hence 
doing research in these two areas can be considered as a scientific passion for knowing the 
unknown.  
In this paper we explore the relationship between the shadow economy and corruption. 
We thereby combine two strands of the literature. The first deals with the impact of corruption 
on the shadow economy; the second with the influence of the shadow economy on corruption. 
In both strands there are important gaps. Regarding the impact of corruption on the shadow 
economy, first, previous studies employ rather small samples. For example, Johnson et al. 
(1997) find that corruption affects the shadow economy positively (and the official economy 
negatively) – in a cross section of, however, only 15 countries. Similar results are presented in 
Johnson et al. (1998), with 39 countries in the relevant equation. Employing instrumental 
variables techniques and even reliable control variables was thus infeasible.  
Second, the few studies investigating the impact of corruption on the shadow economy 
focus on rather heterogeneous country samples. There is no separation of high income and 
low income countries, the exception being Friedman et al. (2000), distinguishing Latin 
America, OECD and transition countries. However, Friedman et al. (2000) have only 15, 20 
and, respectively, 7 observations in their sample, so their results are far from reliable. Indeed, 
there is good reason to expect the relationship between corruption and the shadow economy to 
differ in high and low income countries. In high income countries, bribing government 
officials when detected engaging in the shadow market is rarely an option. Corruption might 
thus be independent of the size of the shadow economy. As Choi and Thum (2004) and 
Dreher, Kotsogiannis and McCorriston (2005a) show, however, the shadow economy can 
mitigate government-induced distortions, so that corruption and the shadow economy could 
also be substitutes. Clearly, in high income countries entrepreneurs do not have to pay the 
bribes demanded by officials as they could always bring the corrupt officials to court. 
  2Consequently, they can choose by themselves whether to pay a bribe or operate underground. 
In low income countries, to the contrary, entrepreneurs engaging in the shadow economy can 
reasonably expect to escape prison when their illegal engagement is detected. Officials 
collude with entrepreneurs and taxpayers in exchange for a bribe (e.g. Hindriks et al. 1999). 
To what extent corruption and the shadow economy are complements or substitutes is thus 
likely to vary among high and low income countries. 
Third, the existing evidence is contradictory and insufficient. Friedman et al. (2000) 
claim "corruption is associated with more unofficial economy". However, in the relevant 
instrumental variables regression, when controlling for the income level, this holds for only 
three out of eight indices employed (p. 480). Further investigation – with a greater sample of 
countries – is needed. 
Turning to the impact of the shadow economy on corruption, empirical evidence is 
virtually non-existent and the literature is not developed beyond the postulation of formal 
models. The exception is Dreher, Kotsogiannis, McCorriston (2005a), employing structural 
equations modeling to empirically confirm the negative impact from the shadow economy to 
corruption (in a sample of 18 OECD countries). 
Finally, the use of perceptions based indices of corruption has recently been 
challenged. As one problem with these indices, it is not obvious, what they actually measure. 
According to Mocan (2004) perceived corruption is completely unrelated to actual corruption 
once other relevant factors are controlled for. Similarly, Weber Abramo (2005) shows that 
perceived corruption is not related to bribery.
1 Analyzing the relationship between corruption 
and shadow economy using a measure of corruption that is not based on perceptions is thus 
clearly warranted. 
This paper makes an attempt to fill these gaps. For the first time in the literature, we 
employ a huge number of estimates of the size of the shadow economy based on the same 
method and all coming from the same source. We employ a cross-section of 120 countries 
over the period 1999-2002 to empirically analyze the relationship between corruption and the 
shadow economy.
2 We employ an index of actual corruption in addition to the usual 
perceptions based indices. The index has been developed in Dreher, Kotsogiannis and 
McCorriston (2005b) and is based on a structural model. A panel of about 100 countries is 
also analyzed. The country sample is split in high and low income countries in order to get 
additional insights about the relationship between corruption and the shadow economy. 
                                                 
1 See Andvig (2005) and Søreide (2005) for further criticism of perceptions based indices of corruption. 
2 Appendix D contains a list of countries included in the empirical analysis. 
  3The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we derive our hypotheses, while 
section 3 discusses the data and method of estimation. In the fourth section, we present the 
empirical results. Finally section 5 gives a summary and draws some conclusions. 
 
2 Hypotheses 
Theoretically, corruption and the shadow economy can be either complements or substitutes. 
Choi and Thum (2004) present a model where the option of entrepreneurs to go underground 
constrains a corrupt official’s ability to ask for bribes. Dreher, Kotsogiannis and McCorriston 
(2005a) extend the model to the explicit specification of institutional quality. The model 
shows that corruption and shadow economy are substitutes in the sense that the existence of 
the shadow economy reduces the propensity of officials to demand grafts.  
Johnson et al. (1997), to the contrary, model corruption and the shadow economy as 
complements. In their full-employment model, labour can be either employed in the official 
sector or in the underground economy. Consequently, an increase in the shadow economy 
always decreases the size of the official market. In their model, corruption increases the 
shadow economy, as corruption can be viewed as one particular form of taxation and 
regulation (driving entrepreneurs underground). Hindriks et al. (1999) also show that the 
shadow economy is a complement to corruption. This is because, in this case, the tax payer 
colludes with the inspector so the inspector underreports the tax liability of the tax payer in 
exchange for a bribe.
3
Theoretically, the relationship between corruption and the shadow economy is thus 
unsettled. There is, however, reason to believe that the relationship might differ among high 
and low income countries. In high income countries, the official sector provides public goods 
like the rule of law, enforcement of contracts, and protection by an efficient police. Usually, 
only craftsmen or very small firms have (or take) the option of going underground. In this 
case, the shadow economy is hidden from tax inspectors and other officials. In other words, 
there are no bribes necessary or possible to buy the way out of the official sector. In high 
income countries – typically showing comparably small levels of corruption – individuals 
confronted with a corrupt official always have the choice to bring the official to court. 
Moreover, in high income countries corruption quite often takes place, for example, to bribe 
officials to get a (huge) contract from the public sector (e.g. in the construction sector). This 
contract is then handled in the official economy and not in the shadow economy. Hence, 
corruption in high income countries can be a means to achieve certain benefits which make 
                                                 
3 See Dreher and Siemers (2005) for a formalization of this argument. 
  4work in the official economy easier, e.g., winning a contract from a public authority, getting a 
licence (e.g. for operating taxes or providing other services or getting the permission to 
convert land into “construction ready” land, etc.). In high income countries people thus bribe 
in order to be able engaging in more official economic activities. As Schneider and Enste 
(2000) point out, at least two thirds of the income earned in the shadow economy is 
immediately spent in the official sector. The shadow economy and the official sector might 
thus be complements. The corresponding increase in government revenue and strengthened 
institutional quality is likely to decrease corruption. The prediction of a negative (substitutive) 
relation between corruption and the shadow economy is in line with the models of Choi and 
Thum (2004) and Dreher, Kotsogiannis and McCorriston (2005a).
4
In low income countries, to the contrary, we expect different mechanisms to prevail. 
Instead of working partly in the official sector and offering additional services underground as 
in high-income countries, enterprises completely engage in underground activity. Examples 
for enterprises operating completely underground are restaurants, bars, or haircutters – and 
even bigger production companies. As one reason for this, the public goods provided by the 
official sector are in many developing countries less efficient as compared to high income 
countries. Big companies, however, are comparably easy to detect and – in order to escape 
taxation and punishment – they have to bribe officials, thereby increasing corruption. 
Corruption often takes place in order to pay for activities in the shadow economy, so that the 
shadow economy entrepreneur can be sure not to be detected by public authorities. Here, 
shadow economy and corruption are likely to reinforce each other, as corruption is needed to 
expand shadow economy activities and – at the same time – underground activities require 
bribes and corruption. To get some additional income from the shadow economy 
entrepreneur, it is natural for public officials to ask for bribes and thus benefit from the 
shadow market. In low income countries, we therefore expect a positive (complementary) 
relation between corruption and the shadow economy. This corresponds to the predictions of 
the models of Hindriks et al. (1999) and Johnson et al. (1997).  
In summary we expect: 
Hypothesis 1: In low income countries, shadow economy activities and 
corruption are complements.  
Hypothesis 2: In high income countries, shadow economy activities and 
corruption are substitutes. 
                                                 
4 Consequently, Dreher, Kotsogiannis and McCorriston (2005a) test their model employing data for OECD 
countries only. 
  5Regarding our control variables, we follow Johnson et al. (1997, 1998) and Friedman et al. 
(2000). Our covariates thus belong to three groups: tax rates and government revenues, 
measures of regulation, and proxies of institutional quality. Johnson et al. (1997, 1998) argue 
that the shadow economy is expected to be higher when there is more regulation and thus 
more discretion for officials. Politicians might use the right to regulate to pursue their own 
interest, such as supporting allies. Politicians can also use the right to regulate to enrich 
themselves by offering relief from regulation in exchange for bribes (Shleifer and Vishny 
1993, Dreher and Siemers 2005): 
Hypothesis 3: The more intensive the official economy is regulated, the 
higher is the shadow economy.  
Hypothesis 4: The more intensive the official economy is regulated, the 
higher is corruption.  
As firms in the unofficial sector largely escape taxation, a higher share of the informal sector 
should be correlated with lower tax revenue (in percent of GDP). However, a heavy fiscal 
burden is likely to drive enterprises underground, a result obtained by Loayza (1996) for Latin 
America and by Johnson et al. (1997) for transition economies. When other relevant 
determinants of the shadow economy are controlled for we thus expect: 
Hypothesis 5: A huge fiscal burden increases the size of the shadow 
economy. 
Regarding corruption, bribes are paid to avoid paying taxes or following regulations, so that a 
high fiscal burden is hypothesized to increase corruption. 
Hypothesis 6: The higher the fiscal burden, the higher is corruption. 
Better institutional quality, finally, increases the benefits entrepreneurs can derive from 
operating in the official sector, most likely leading to a reduction of the unofficial sector. 
Almost by definition, better institutions also imply lower levels of corruption. We therefore 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 7: Better institutional quality reduces the size of the shadow 
economy. 
Hypothesis 8: Better institutional quality reduces corruption. 
The next section outlines our method of estimation and presents the data. 
 
  63. Data and Estimation Technique 
We start with estimating regressions for a cross-section of countries. The equations take the 
following form: 
i i i i Z X Y ε β β α + + + = 2
'
1  ,  (1) 
where Y and X represent either corruption or, respectively, the shadow economy and Z is a 
vector of control variables. 
In order to increase the number of observations, all data are averages over the period 
2000-2002. Data for the shadow economy are taken from Schneider (2005a). Schneider 
calculates the size and development of the shadow economy of 145 countries, including 
developing, transition and highly developed OECD countries over the period 1999 to 2003 
employing the dymimic and currency demand estimation technique.
5 The average size of the 
shadow economy as a percent of official GDP in 2002/03 in 96 developing countries was 
38.7%, in 25 transition countries 40.1%, in 21 OECD countries 16.3%, and in 3 communist 
countries 22.3%.  
To measure corruption, we employ an index provided by the International Country 
Risk Guide. This indicator is based on the analysis of a world-wide network of experts.
6 On 
the original scale, the index has a range from 0 – representing highest corruption – to 6 (no 
corruption). We rescaled the index, so that higher values represent more corruption. We have 
120 countries in our sample for which both data for the shadow economy and corruption are 
available. 
Again following the previous literature, each regression also includes the log of per 
capita GDP, taken from the World Bank’s (2003) World Development Indicators. Measures 
for institutional quality and regulatory burden are from Gwartney and Lawson (2004), the 
Heritage Foundation (2005), and Kaufmann et al. (2003). The variables are discussed in more 
detail when we present the regression results. Appendix B lists all variables with their exact 
sources and definitions; Appendix C reports descriptive statistics. 
After including each explanatory variable individually to our regressions, we follow a 
general to specific approach eliminating those variables with the smallest t-value until we end 
up with a model containing only those variables (in addition to per capita GDP, the index of 
corruption and, respectively, the shadow economy) that are significant at the ten percent level 
at least. 
                                                 
5 See also Schneider (2005b). 
6 Note that the focus of this index is on capturing political risk involved in corruption. Since it is the only 
perception-based data on corruption providing consistent time series, the index has nevertheless been widely 
used in empirical studies. 
  7In the full model, we check for the influence of outliers using an algorithm that is 
robust to them. The robust regression technique weighs observations in an iterative process. 
Starting with OLS, estimates are obtained through weighted least squares where observations 
with relatively large residuals get smaller weight. This results in estimates not being overly 
influenced by any specific observation.  
The sample is then split in two income (per capita) groups to test our hypothesis 1 and 
2.
7  
Depending on which covariates are included in the regressions, there are between 43-71 
countries in the low income group. The number of countries with high income is between 37-
48. Due to the substantially reduced number of observations we have to interpret the results of 
some regressions cautiously. 
Clearly, taking corruption and the shadow economy as exogenous determinants of 
each other contradicts our a priori hypotheses. We therefore employ instrumental variables to 
deal with the potential endogeneity of corruption and the shadow economy. We employ two 
sets of instruments for each variable. First, the determinants of corruption and the shadow 
economy identified in the general to specific approach are employed. Second, we use the 
instruments for corruption suggested by Friedman et al. (2000): Ethnic and religious 
fractionalization, a country’s latitude, and French, socialist, German, and Scandinavian legal 
origin. The variables have been shown to be correlated with institutional development across 
a wide range of countries (La Porta et al. 1999). Regarding the shadow economy, a range of 
variables determining the costs of doing business in a country have recently been developed 
by the World Bank (Djankov et al. 2002). According to the results of Friedman et al. (2000) 
entrepreneurs go underground mainly to reduce the burden of bureaucracy. The variables 
measuring costs and required time to open a business and flexibility with respect to hiring and 
firing workers thus appear to be natural instruments for the shadow economy. We employ 
them as our second set. Our second equation takes the form: 
i i i I X ε γ + = 1
' , (2) 
with I representing the vector of instrumental variables. F-tests on the joint 
significance of our instruments show that they are good predictors of the degree of corruption 
and, respectively, the shadow economy. In most (but not all) cases, the overidentifying 
restrictions are also accepted. 
                                                 
7 Countries are in the first group if their 2004 GNI per capita does not exceed $3,255, and in the second 
otherwise. We choose to split the sample instead of using interaction terms as specification tests reject most of 
the regressions including all countries but accept most sub-sample regressions. 
  8  Turning to the panel estimations, our data cover the years 1994-2002, for 70 
countries. We employ averages over three years for all variables. However, some of the data 
are not available for all countries or every year. Therefore, our panel data are unbalanced and 
the number of observations depends on the choice of explanatory variables. Again, we also 
present results employing instrumental variables. We only employ those instruments that 
show some variation over time. Equation (1) and (2) transform to: 
it it it it Z X Y ε β β α + + + = 2
'
1  ,  (3) 
it it it I X ε γ + = 1
' , (4) 
 
The next section presents the results. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Stepwise Regression Results 
Before we present the results of the full model, we turn to the regressions including one 
explanatory variable at the time. Results for the shadow economy are reported in Tables A-1 
to A-6 in the Appendix. Except for the index of corruption, we have kept the original signs on 
the variables, so that different organizations’ ratings differ in whether a high numerical value 
corresponds to “better” values. The Heritage Foundation measure of fiscal burden refers to 
average and marginal corporate and income taxation. Its index of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
to trade captures international trade taxation and regulation. A higher score (on a scale of 1-5) 
implies a higher burden of taxation, i.e. higher average and marginal tax rates and, 
respectively, higher taxes on trade. The Fraser Institute’s measures of taxes (Gwartney and 
Lawson 2004) show higher scores for countries with lower tax rates, on a scale of 1-10. We 
employ their indices for the top marginal income tax rate and taxes on international trade. In 
addition, we employ tax revenue and overall revenue (both in percent of GDP) from the 
World Bank’s (2003) World Development Indicators. 
The results show, surprisingly, that our measures of tax burden are not correlated with 
the shadow economy at the five percent level of significance (when we control for per capita 
GDP). There is thus no support for our hypothesis 5. However, at the ten percent level of 
significance higher fiscal burden is associated with less unofficial activity. This is in line with 
the results of Friedman et al. (2000) for a cross section of 69 countries, showing that higher 
tax rates imply a smaller shadow market and Johnson et al. (1998). 
According to our results – and contrary to hypothesis 6 – corruption is significantly 
more severe in countries with smaller fiscal burden. Higher barriers to trade significantly 
  9increase corruption. This is in line with the theoretical model and empirical evidence 
presented in Dreher and Siemers (2005) for capital account restrictions: Economic agents 
facing more severe restrictions engage in bribery to pursue their business anyway. 
Turning to the importance of regulations, we employ seven measures produced by the 
Heritage Foundation and the Fraser Institute. Again, the Fraser Institute’s measures range 
from 0 to 10, where higher values indicate less regulations. The indices refer to regulations in 
the credit market, minimum wage regulation, price regulation, administrative procedures, and 
the time to spend with government bureaucracy. We take two indices from Heritage. The first 
measures wage and price regulation, the second is an overall measure of the degree of 
regulations in the economy. Again the scale ranges from 1 to 5, with higher values indicating 
regulations that are worse for business. 
As can be seen in the tables, at the five percent level at least, the shadow economy 
expands with fewer regulations in the credit market, higher minimum wages and stricter 
administrative procedures. While the first result is surprising, the latter two are in line with 
hypothesis 3. At least at the five percent level of significance, corruption is more severe with 
stronger regulation in the credit market, stronger wage and price regulations, and the overall 
Heritage index of regulations, supporting hypothesis 4. 
Regarding institutional quality, we employ three indices constructed by the Fraser 
Institute, and two from the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 2003). On the scale of the Fraser 
indices (0-10), higher values imply a “better” legal system. We employ their indices for 
judicial independence, impartial courts, and the integrity of the legal system. The World 
Bank’s government effectiveness and rule of law indicators range from -2.28 to 2.59 and, 
respectively, -2.04 to 2.36, with higher scores showing “better” environments. 
The results are straightforward: both corruption and the shadow economy are 
significantly smaller with better rule of law, greater government effectiveness, more judicial 
independence, impartial courts, and higher integrity of the legal system, supporting 
hypotheses 7 and 8.  
So far, the results also show that corruption is rarely a significant determinant of the 
shadow economy. In those regressions where its coefficient is significantly different from 
zero, higher corruption implies a higher shadow economy. Similarly, the shadow economy is 
significantly associated with more corruption in some regressions. However, corruption and 
the shadow economy are never significant when variables controlling for the quality of 
institutions are included. Clearly, without the inclusion of additional control variables the 
regressions showing a significant effect of the shadow market or, respectively, of corruption, 
  10are likely to be misspecified. The RESET test indicates that relevant variables are not 




4.2 Regression Results of the Full Model 
Table 1 presents the results of the full model explaining the size of the shadow economy. As 
can be seen, only three variables turned out to be robust determinants of the unofficial sector. 
The shadow market shrinks with stronger regulations in the credit market, contradicting our a 
priori expectation. The coefficient is significant at the one percent level both in the OLS and 
the robust regression. Also at the one percent level, government effectiveness reduces the size 
of the informal sector. This is intuitive: the more effective the government, the greater the 
benefits of operating in the legal sector. Moreover, the risk of getting caught engaging in 
illegal activities is higher with more effective governments. Stronger minimum wage 
regulation also increases the shadow economy, with a coefficient significant at the one 
percent level in the OLS regression, and at the five percent level in the robust regression. The 
result is in line with our  hypothesis 3: Stronger regulatory burden drives entrepreneurs 
underground.
8
As the results of Table 1 show, corruption does not significantly affect the shadow 
economy. This is in contrast to the results of Johnson et al. (1998) reporting corruption to be 
among the major determinants of the unofficial sector. However, their regressions neglect the 
impact of institutional and governmental quality. Once institutional quality and government 
effectiveness is taken into account, neither GDP per capita nor corruption have a significant 
impact on the shadow economy. The results of Table 1 show that this is true for both income 
groups. This is in line with the results of Bjørnskov (2005) showing that the perceptions based 
index of corruption developed by Kaufmann et al. (2003) cannot be separated statistically 
from their other five indices of governance. Similarly, Andvig (2005), and Weber Abramo 
(2005) argue that perceptions based indices reflect the quality of a country's institutions rather 
than its actual degree of corruption. 
Table 2 reports results for the full model explaining perceived corruption. As can be 
seen, price regulation leads to more corruption, while corruption is lower with better rule of 
law and greater democracy. While the fiscal burden significantly reduces corruption at the ten 
percent level of significance according to the OLS results, the coefficient is not significant in 
                                                 
8 The correlation between credit market regulation and the rule of law is about 0.7, but the Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIFs) are consistently low, so there should be no problem identifying effects due to collinearity. 
  11the robust regression. GDP per capita has no significant impact on corruption in the overall 
sample – and neither does the shadow economy. However, a bigger shadow economy reduces 
corruption in high income countries, with a coefficient significant at the one percent level. 
Corruption and the shadow economy are thus substitutes in high income countries. 
Quantitatively, a ten percentage points increase of the shadow economy (in percent of GDP) 
reduces the index of corruption by 0.7 points in high income countries. The standardised 
regression (beta) coefficient is 0.47.  
We proceed with our instrumental variables approach. Table 3 shows that the results 
for the shadow economy are very similar to those presented above. Again, the index of 
corruption is not significant at the five percent level in any regression (while corruption 
reduces the shadow market at the ten percent level of significance in high income countries). 
The Sargan test accepts the overidentifying restrictions at the one percent level in all but the 
final regressions, where the restrictions are accepted at the ten percent level. Table 4 shows 
the correlation between the two sets of instruments and the residuals of the full model. The 
table shows that the correlation between the instruments and the residuals is reasonably low. 
The table also shows the comparably high correlation between most of the instruments and 
the endogenous variable (corruption).  
Tables 5 and 6 replicate the analysis with corruption as the dependent variable. Again, 
the results are similar to those presented previously. However, the shadow economy no longer 
significantly affects corruption in high income countries.  
Finally, we report results for the combined cross-section time-series analysis in Tables 
7 (shadow economy) and 8 (corruption). They show that corruption increases the size of the 
shadow economy. When both income groups are included, this is true when the regression is 
estimated with fixed or random effects, and when corruption is instrumented with the time 
varying set of instruments.
9 An increase in the index of corruption by one point increases the 
shadow economy (in percent of GDP) by 1.3-3.5 percentage points (which amounts to 
standardised (beta) coefficients between 0.12-0.32). In high income countries, corruption also 
increases the size of the informal sector, while it has no significant impact in low income 
countries. 
Finally, Table 8 shows that corruption is higher with a bigger informal sector also. In 
the fixed and random effects specifications, its coefficient is significant at the one percent 
level. The same is true in low income countries, where corruption again rises with the size of 
                                                 
9 Note that we do not instrument them with variables that do not change over time. 
  12the shadow market. In high income countries no significant impact exists. The same is true 
when the shadow economy is instrumented. 
In summary, there is some evidence that corruption and the shadow economy are 
complements in countries with low income (hypothesis 1), while going underground is an 
alternative to corruption in high income countries (hypothesis 2). 
 
4.3 Further Discussion 
We test the robustness of our results employing two alternative indicators of perceived 
corruption. The first is the corruption perceptions index developed by Transparency 
International (TI), ranging from zero to ten. The second index is from the World Bank’s 
‘governance matters’ database (Kaufmann et al. 2003) with values between -1.85 and 2.58. 
We transform both indices so that higher values represent greater perceived corruption. 
The results show that there is no significant relationship between corruption and the 
shadow economy when the TI index is used. There is one exception: In high income 
countries, corruption decreases with a greater shadow economy, with a coefficient significant 
at the five percent level. The result is presented in Table 9. Table 9 also shows that the result 
remains when the World Bank index of corruption is used instead. No other regression shows 
a significant relation between the World Bank index and the size of the shadow economy (not 
reported in the table). 
Perceptions based indices are, however, not free of problems. One such problem refers 
to the correlation between perceived corruption and actual corruption. According to Mocan 
(2004) the two are completely unrelated once other relevant factors are controlled for. 
Similarly, Weber Abramo (2005) shows that perceived corruption is not related to bribery. 
Our results might thus arise from the poor quality of the perceptions based indices of 
corruption. We therefore employ an alternative index of actual corruption to test the stability 
of the results. The index has been developed in Dreher, Kotsogiannis and McCorriston 
(2005b) and is based on a structural model. The statistical method applied infers the 
magnitude of corruption from both the likely causes and likely effects of corruption. The 
index is available for about 100 countries for the year 2000 and ranges from 1 to 10, where 
higher values again represent more corruption. 
When replicated with the index of actual corruption the regressions show that 
corruption does not significantly influence the size of the underground sector in any 
regression. We do therefore not present the results in a table. However, there is a significant 
impact of the shadow economy on corruption. The results of the OLS and robust regressions 
  13are presented in Table 10; Table 11 presents the IV estimates.
10 As can be seen, corruption 
increases with the size of the underground sector, with coefficients significant at the ten 
percent level in the OLS and robust regressions. The disaggregated results show that the 
positive impact of the shadow economy on corruption is driven by low income countries. The 
results show that the magnitude of the coefficient is economically relevant. In low income 
countries, a one percentage point increase in the shadow economy (in percent of GDP) 
increases the index of corruption by 0.06 points (equivalent to a standardized beta coefficient 
of 0.36). The coefficient of the shadow economy is significant at the five percent level in low 
income countries, while it is insignificant in high income countries. 
The results are similar when the shadow economy is instrumented with the two sets of 
instruments introduced above. When the determinants of the shadow economy identified by 
the general to specific approach are employed, corruption is again significantly higher with a 
larger shadow economy. This is true in the overall sample and in the low income sample (at 
the five percent level of significance). When the costs and flexibility of doing business are 
employed as instruments instead, the results are similar.  
Table 12 summarizes our results. Overall, they show that an increase in perceived 
corruption over time also increases the shadow economy. This confirms the models of 
Johnson et al. (1997, 1998) and Hindriks et al. (1999). Across countries, however, greater 
perceived corruption does not lead to a greater shadow economy. To some extent this also 
supports the results of Méon and Sekkat (2004) showing the within-country variation to be 
important in their analysis of corruption on foreign direct investment and exports. 
Regarding the impact of the shadow economy on perceived corruption, our results for 
the overall sample are similar to those for the other way round. In the cross-country 
regressions, all coefficients are completely insignificant. An increase in the shadow economy 
over time increases corruption according to the fixed and random effects estimator, but not 
when the endogeneity of the shadow is controlled for. Turning to the sub-samples, the results 
show that higher perceived corruption significantly reduces the shadow economy in high 
income countries, confirming the models of Choi and Thum (2004) and Dreher, Kotsogiannis 
and McCorriston (2005a). In low income countries, to the contrary, corruption tends to 
increase with a higher shadow economy, again confirming the models of Johnson et al. (1997, 
1998) and Hindriks et al. (1999). This is true for the impact of perceived corruption in the 
within-groups specification and actual corruption in all specifications. 
                                                 
10 Note that the index of actual corruption shows no variation over time, so we can not replicate the panel 
regressions. 
  14In summary, the results of our empirical analysis suggest that corruption and the 
shadow economy tend to be substitutes in high income countries, but complements in low 
income countries. There is thus some support for our main hypotheses (1 and 2). The analysis 
also shows, however, that the results do to some extent depend on the method of estimation. 
The next section concludes. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have made a first attempt to deal with the dual relationship between 
corruption and the shadow economy. We hypothesized that the shadow economy and 
corruption are substitutes in high income countries. In low income countries, to the contrary, 
we expected the shadow economy and corruption to be complements. The empirical findings 
are more or less in line with these two hypotheses, although the results depend to some extent 
on how the regressions are specified and how corruption is measured. In summary there is 
evidence that going underground is an alternative to corruption in high income countries (this 
means a substitutive relationship) while corruption and the shadow economy are complements 
in countries with low and middle income. We also find a positive impact of regulation on the 
shadow economy, while our results regarding taxation are mixed. Our results show that 
heavier regulation leads to more corruption, while better rule of law and greater democracy 
imply less corruption.  
What type of conclusions can we draw from these results? In general we must admit 
we have no clear and robust pattern that confirms our hypotheses among the range of 
indicators and specifications employed. Clearly, one of the most important problems in 
empirical studies on corruption and the shadow economy is the unavailability of high quality 
data both across countries and – more severely – over time. Our analysis confirms the 
importance of the choice of indicator on the results. If we use actual corruption figures as 
calculated by Dreher, Kotsogiannis and McCorriston (2005b) instead of indices of perceived 
corruption, e.g., our results show a strongly significant impact of the shadow economy on 
corruption in low income countries. However, these data are only available for one year. 
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  17Table 1: Determinants of the Shadow Economy – Full Model 
OLS RR
Low High
Corruption (ICRG) 1.88 1.32 3.57 -0.84
(1.20) (0.82) (1.34) (0.97)
Log GDP per capita -2.42 -2.44 -2.41 -6.54
(1.37) (1.34) (1.05) (1.73*)
Credit Market Regulations (Fraser) 4.89 4.29 6.20 -0.27
(2.74***) (2.89***) (3.13***) (0.23)
Minimum Wage Regulation (Fraser) -4.53 -3.71 -5.95 4.12
(2.64***) (2.29**) (3.15***) (1.26)
Government Effectiveness (World Bank) -9.69 -9.80 -9.42 -7.81
(3.17***) (2.69***) (2.51**) (2.37**)
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.51 0.5
Observations 70 70 45 25
F-test (Prob>F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Normality test (Prob>chi2) 0.31 0.29 0.19 0.11
Heteroscedasticity test (Prob>chi2) 0.03 0.98 0.44
RESET (Prob>F) 0.16 0.59 0.92
Income
 
Notes: OLS and robust (RR) regressions; robust absolute t-statistics in parentheses. 
* denotes significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
Higher values represent more corruption (ICRG), less regulation (Fraser), and better quality (World Bank). 
Constant included but not reported. 
 
  18Table 2: Determinants of Corruption – Full Model 
Low High
Shadow Economy 0.003 0.003 0.008 -0.07
(0.41) (0.43) (1.14) (3.57***)
Log GDP per capita 0.07 0.01 0.029 1.13
(0.62) (0.08) (0.24) (3.98***)
Fiscal Burden (Heritage) -0.27 -0.18 -0.08 -0.41
(1.91*) (1.45) (0.51) (0.80)
Regulation of Prices (Fraser) -0.18 -0.19 -0.16 -0.14
(3.67***) (3.67***) (2.91***) (1.12)
Rule of Law (World Bank) -0.66 -0.64 -0.44 -2.88
(3.80***) (3.71***) (2.38**) (5.18***)
Democracy -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.05
(2.59**) (2.62***) (1.504) (0.42)
Adjusted R2 0.62 0.35 0.69
Observations 98 98 71 27
F-test (Prob>F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Normality test (Prob>chi2) 0.07 0.02 0.17 0.73
Heteroscedasticity test (Prob>chi2) 0.27 0.00 0.50





Notes: OLS and robust (RR) regressions; robust absolute t-statistics in parentheses. 
* denotes significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
Higher values represent more corruption (ICRG), higher burden (Heritage), less regulation (Fraser), better 
quality (World Bank), and more democracy. 
Constant included but not reported. 
 
  19Table 3: Determinants of the Shadow Economy, Full Model, Instrumental Variables 
All Low High All Low High
Corruption (ICRG) 3.72 3.12 5.41 -4.04 5.14 -1.85
(1.17) (0.86) (1.40) (1.33) (0.78) (1.91*)
Log GDP per capita -1.98 -2.52 -8.49 -3.17 -1.95 -6.24
(1.10) (1.11) (2.17**) (1.62) (0.78) (1.50)
Credit Market Regulations (Fraser) 5.82 6.05 5.96 2.38 6.87 -1.12
(3.00***) (2.92***) (1.49) (1.03) (2.31**) (0.95)
Minimum Wage Regulation (Fraser) -4.49 -5.94 6.25 -4.18 -5.89 3.85
(2.55**) (3.18***) (1.90*) (2.32**) (2.83***) (1.10)
Government Effectiveness (World Bank) -9.08 -9.60 -9.10 -12.64 -8.81 -8.08
(2.59**) (2.35**) (2.07**) (3.44***) (2.01**) (2.42**)
Adjusted R2 0.66 0.51 -0.11 0.60 0.47 0.43
Observations 69 45 24 67 43 24





(1) Corruption instrumented with Fiscal Burden (Heritage), Regulation of Prices (Fraser), Rule of Law (World 
Bank), Democracy. 
(2) Corruption instrumented with Ethnic Fractionalization, Religious Fractionalization, Latitude, French Legacy, 
Socialist Legacy, German Legacy, Scandinavian Legacy. 
* denotes significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level  
Higher values represent more corruption (ICRG), less regulation (Fraser), and better quality (World Bank). 
Constant included but not reported. 
 
 
Table 4: Instruments for Corruption – Correlation between Instruments and Residuals/ 
Endogenous Explanatory Variable 
 
Residuals of Full Model Corruption (ICRG)
Corruption (ICRG) -0.03
Log GDP per capita 0.04 -0.61
Fiscal Burden (Heritage) -0.08 -0.11
Regulation of Prices (Fraser) 0.11 -0.46
Rule of Law (World Bank) 0.06 -0.72
Democracy 0.14 -0.50
Ethnic fractionalization -0.08 0.34
Religious fractionalization 0.07 -0.02
Latitude 0.14 -0.52
French legal origin 0.06 0.17
Socialist legal origin 0.05 0.06
German legal origin -0.02 -0.20
Scandinavian legal origin -0.02 -0.40
  20Table 5: Determinants of Corruption, Full Model, Instrumental Variables 
All Low High All Low High
Shadow Economy -0.03 -0.01 -0.09 -0.02 -0.02 -0.11
(1.28) (0.42) (1.57) (0.66) (0.46) (1.45)
Log GDP per capita -0.04 -0.17 1.11 -0.03 -0.08 1.06
(0.25) (1.30) (2.58**) (0.24) (0.60) (2.93***)
Fiscal Burden (Heritage) 0.004 0.11 -0.53 -0.40 -0.20 -0.50
(0.02) (0.67) (0.84) (2.17**) (1.14) (0.91)
Regulation of Prices (Fraser) -0.20 -0.21 -0.12 -0.16 -0.11 -0.13
(3.04***) (3.37***) (0.90) (2.09**) (1.09) (1.01)
Rule of Law (World Bank) -0.94 -0.57 -3.23 -0.84 -0.58 -3.30
(2.96***) (2.10**) (4.17***) (2.30**) (1.83*) (3.50***)
Democracy -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
(2.44**) (1.88*) (0.82) (1.50) (0.96) (0.28)
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.39 0.56 0.57 0.22 0.67
Observations 69 45 24 94 68 26





 (1) Shadow Economy instrumented with Credit Market Regulations (Fraser), Minimum Wage Regulation 
(Fraser), Government Effectiveness (World Bank). 
(2) Shadow Economy instrumented with Starting a Business (Duration), Starting a Business (Costs), Flexibility 
to Hire, Flexibility to Fire. 
* denotes significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level  
Higher values represent more corruption (ICRG), higher burden (Heritage), less regulation (Fraser), better 
quality (World Bank), and more democracy. 
Constant included but not reported. 
 
 
Table 6: Instruments for the Shadow Economy – Correlation between Instruments and 
Residuals/ Endogenous Explanatory Variable 
 
Residuals of Full Model Shadow Economy
Shadow Economy -0.05
Log GDP per capita 0.15 -0.71
Credit Market Regulations (Fraser) 0.37 -0.37
Minimum Wage Regulation (Fraser) 0.04 -0.49
Government Effectiveness (World Bank) 0.13 -0.76
Starting a Business (Duration) 0.22 0.33
Starting a Business (Costs) 0.16 0.53
Flexibility to Hire 0.19 0.18
Flexibility to Fire 0.12 0.37  
 
 
  21Table 7: Determinants of the Shadow Economy, Full Model, Panel 
Low High
Corruption (ICRG) 1.34 1.59 1.36 0.69 3.46
(2.63**) (4.81***) (1.42) (1.98**) (3.48***)
Log GDP per capita -0.81 -5.48 -5.33 -2.95 -14.60
(0.15) (4.20***) (0.86) (0.42) (1.88*)
Credit Market Regulations (Fraser) 0.06 0.48 0.11 0.33 -0.04
(0.14) (1.25) (0.25) (1.42) (0.09)
Minimum Wage Regulation (Fraser) -0.89 -1.04 -1.37 -0.33 -0.73
(3.97***) (5.54***) (4.50***) (1.76*) (3.00***)
Government Effectiveness (World Bank) -0.11 -1.47 -1.74 6.30 4.89
(0.05) (1.00) (0.54) (1.72*) (1.53)
Method FE RE FE FE IV
R2 (overall) 0.99 0.56 0.23 0.99 0.45
Observations 118 118 69 49 116
F-test (Prob>F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Normality test (Prob>chi2) 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00






The low income group has not enough observations. 
FE: fixed country effects included. 
RE: random effects model. 
IV: Corruption instrumented with Fiscal Burden (Heritage), Regulation of Prices (Fraser), Rule of Law (World 
Bank), Democracy. 
* denotes significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level  




  22Table 8: Determinants of Corruption, Full Model, Panel 
Low High
Shadow Economy 0.09 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.01
(2.88***) (2.64***) (2.77***) (0.76) (0.12)
Log GDP per capita 2.10 0.15 1.54 2.99 3.88
(2.39**) (1.49) (1.16) (2.15**) (2.85***)
Fiscal Burden (Heritage) -0.33 -0.44 -0.27 -0.33 -0.69
(1.51) (4.00***) (1.12) (0.59) (2.42**)
Regulation of Prices (Fraser) -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 0.03 -0.09
(1.04) (1.44) (0.99) (0.17) (1.00)
Rule of Law (World Bank) -0.64 -0.75 -0.48 -0.53 -2.61
(1.03) (4.18***) (0.67) (0.31) (2.39**)
Democracy 0.08 -0.05 0.08 0.76 0.03
(2.21**) (2.54***) (2.33**) (1.07) (0.27)
Method FE RE FE FE IV
R2 (overall) 0.91 0.58 0.54 0.91 0.21
Observations 183 183 131 52 116
F-test (Prob>F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Normality test (Prob>chi2) 0.00 0.77 0.09 0.00 0.00





FE: fixed country effects included. 
RE: random effects model. 
IV: Corruption instrumented with Fiscal Burden (Heritage), Regulation of Prices (Fraser), Rule of Law (World 
Bank), Democracy. 
* denotes significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level  
Higher values represent more corruption (ICRG), higher burden (Heritage), less regulation (Fraser), better 
quality (World Bank), and more democracy. 
  23Table 9: Determinants of Corruption in high income countries (TI and World Bank) – 
Full Model 
TI World Bank
Shadow Economy -0.06 -0.01
(2.35**) (2.76**)
Log GDP per capita 0.19 -0.29
(0.49) (2.80**)
Fiscal Burden (Heritage) -0.29 -0.14
(0.52) (1.62)
Regulation of Prices (Fraser) -0.30 -0.06
(2.55**) (1.91*)




Adjusted R2 0.80 0.90
Observations 24 27
F-test (Prob>F) 0.00 0.00
Normality test (Prob>chi2) 0.00 0.07
Heteroscedasticity test (Prob>chi2) 0.14 0.47
RESET (Prob>F) 0.30 0.83  
Notes: OLS regressions; robust absolute t-statistics in parentheses. 
* denotes significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
Higher values represent more corruption (Transparency International (TI) and World Bank), higher burden 
(Heritage), less regulation (Fraser), better quality (World Bank), and more democracy. 
Constant included but not reported. 
  24Table 10: Determinants of Corruption (DKM) – Full Model 
Low High
Shadow Economy 0.04 0.04 0.06 -0.10
(1.77*) (1.69*) (2.49**) (1.50)
Log GDP per capita -0.17 -0.31 -0.16 -0.58
(0.53) (0.95) (0.44) (0.39)
Fiscal Burden (Heritage) 0.10 0.11 0.35 -1.72
(0.33) (0.24) (0.73) (1.51)
Regulation of Prices (Fraser) -0.19 -0.20 -0.26 -0.18
(1.46) (1.18) (1.70*) (0.45)
Rule of Law (World Bank) 0.88 1.13 0.76 -0.46
(1.50) (1.98**) (1.24) (0.22)
Democracy -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 0.28
(0.97) (0.67) (0.30) (0.86)
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.16 0.69
Observations 90 90 65 25
F-test (Prob>F) 0.33 0.37 0.05 0.61
Normality test (Prob>chi2) 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.01
Heteroscedasticity test (Prob>chi2) 0.87 0.57 0.22




Notes: OLS and robust (RR) regressions; robust absolute t-statistics in parentheses. 
* denotes significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
Higher values represent more corruption (Dreher, Kotsogiannis, McCorriston 2005b), higher burden (Heritage), 
less regulation (Fraser), better quality (World Bank), and more democracy. 
Constant included but not reported. 
  25Table 11: Determinants of Corruption (DKM), Full Model, Instrumental Variables 
All Low High All Low High
Shadow Economy 0.14 0.10 -0.32 0.12 0.12 0.04
(2.59**) (2.65**) (1.22) (2.45**) (2.50**) (0.19)
Log GDP per capita 0.41 0.26 -0.94 0.13 0.12 -0.16
(0.76) (0.41) (0.46) (0.35) (0.27) (0.11)
Fiscal Burden (Heritage) 0.09 0.82 -3.51 0.11 0.39 -1.47
(0.18) (1.18) (2.20**) (0.34) (0.71) (1.31)
Regulation of Prices (Fraser) -0.44 -0.41 -0.16 -0.41 -0.45 -0.20
(2.10**) (2.00**) (0.41) (2.45**) (2.29**) (0.42)
Rule of Law (World Bank) 1.58 0.67 -4.04 1.66 1.29 0.82
(1.80*) (0.83) (1.23) (2.61**) (1.94*) (0.28)
Democracy -0.08 0.04 0.18 -0.12 -0.07 0.20
(0.79) (0.34) (0.98) (1.50) (0.76) (0.60)
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.23 -0.18 -0.04 0.25 -0.23
Observations 66 43 23 86 62 24





 (1) Shadow Economy instrumented with Credit Market Regulations (Fraser), Minimum Wage Regulation 
(Fraser), Government Effectiveness (World Bank). 
(2) Shadow Economy instrumented with Starting a Business (Duration), Starting a Business (Costs), Flexibility 
to Hire, Flexibility to Fire. 
* denotes significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level  
Higher values represent more corruption (Dreher, Kotsogiannis, McCorriston 2005b), higher burden (Heritage), 
less regulation (Fraser), better quality (World Bank), and more democracy. 
Constant included but not reported. 
 
  26Table 12: Summary 
Dependent Variable:
Independent Variable:
All Low High All Low High
ICRG index of corruption
OLS 1.88 3.57 -0.84 0.00 0.01 -0.07
(1.20) (1.34) (0.97) (0.41) (1.14) (3.57***)
Robust regression 1.32 0.00
(0.82) (0.43)
IV, set 1 3.72 3.12 5.41 -0.03 -0.01 -0.09
(1.17) (0.86) (1.40) (1.28) (0.42) (1.57)
IV, set 2 -4.04 5.14 -1.85 -0.02 -0.02 -0.11
(1.33) (0.78) (1.91*) (0.66) (0.46) (1.45)
Panel, fixed effects 1.34 1.36 0.69 0.09 0.10 0.09
(2.63**) (1.42) (1.98**) (2.88***) (2.77***) (0.76)
Panel, random effects 1.59 0.02
(4.81***) (2.64***)
Panel IV 3.46 0.01
(3.48***) (0.12)
TI index of corruption
OLS -0.06
(2.35**)
World Bank Index of corruption
OLS -0.01
(2.76**)
DKM index of corruption




IV, set 1 0.14 0.10 -0.32
(2.59**) (2.65**) (1.22)






Instruments for the shadow economy are: (1) Credit Market Regulations (Fraser), Minimum Wage Regulation 
(Fraser), Government Effectiveness (World Bank); (2) Starting a Business (Duration), Starting a Business 
(Costs), Flexibility to Hire, Flexibility to Fire. 
Instruments for corruption are: (1) Fiscal Burden (Heritage), Regulation of Prices (Fraser), Rule of Law (World 
Bank), Democracy; (2) Ethnic Fractionalization, Religious Fractionalization, Latitude, French Legacy, Socialist 
Legacy, German Legacy, Scandinavian Legacy. 
 
* denotes significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level  
 
  27Appendix A 
Table A-1: Determinants of the Shadow Economy – Tax Burden 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corruption (ICRG) 1.45 1.71 1.91 2.18 3.04 3.26
(1.41) (1.54) (1.90*) (2.40**) (1.62) (1.98*)
Log GDP per capita -5.28 -5.61 -5.41 -5.28 -3.82 -3.68
(7.61***) (7.62***) (5.62***) (5.70***) (2.16**) (2.31**)
Fiscal Burden (Heritage) -2.47
(1.89*)
Top marginal income tax rate (Fraser) -0.05
(0.20)
Taxes on international trade (Fraser) 0.26
(0.29)
Trade Barriers (Heritage) -1.22
(0.87)
Taxes (percent of GDP) -0.10
(0.56)
Revenue (percent of GDP) -0.20
(1.15)
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.25 0.29
Observations 118 95 103 118 57 59
F-test (Prob>F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Normality test (Prob>chi2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03
Heteroscedasticity test (Prob>chi2) 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04
RESET (Prob>F) 0.13 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.07  
 
Notes: OLS regressions; robust absolute t-statistics in parentheses. 
* denotes significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
Higher values represent more corruption (ICRG), higher burden (Heritage) and smaller burden (Fraser). 
Constant included but not reported. 
 
  28Table A-2: Determinants of the Shadow Economy – Measures of Regulation 
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )
Corruption (ICRG) 2.22 1.13 2.24 0.76 1.05 2.41 2.01
(2.15**) (0.80) (2.12**) (0.54) (0.75) (2.43**) (2.14**)
Log GDP per capita -6.19 -6.16 -5.68 -6.22 -5.85 -5.34 -4.86
(8.33***) (4.49) (6.25***) (4.71***) (3.42***) (8.04***) (6.86***)
Credit Market Regulations (Fraser) 1.48
(2.16**)
Minimum Wage Regulation (Fraser) -5.78
(3.22***)
Regulation of Prices (Fraser) 0.63
(0.89)
Administrative Procedures (Fraser) -5.65
(2.58**)
Time with government bureaucracy (Fraser) -1.97
(1.30)




Adjusted R2 0.49 0.56 0.48 0.56 0.51 0.45 0.43
Observations 103 70 102 70 70 117 117
F-test (Prob>F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Normality test (Prob>chi2) 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.01
Heteroscedasticity test (Prob>chi2) 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.02
RESET (Prob>F) 0.13 0.42 0.18 0.12 0.27 0.03 0.03  
 
Notes: OLS regressions; robust absolute t-statistics in parentheses. 
* denotes significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
Higher values represent more corruption (ICRG), more regulation (Heritage), and less regulation (Fraser). 
Constant included but not reported. 
 
  29Table A-3: Determinants of the Shadow Economy – Institutional Quality  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Corruption (ICRG) -0.17 0.07 -0.06 1.17 1.04
(0.17) (0.07) (0.03) (1.04) (1.03)
Log GDP per capita -0.82 -1.82 -5.25 -3.55 -3.96
(0.84) (1.85*) (5.00***) (4.07***) (4.93)
Rule of Law (World Bank) -8.81
(5.01***)
Government Effectiveness (World Bank) -7.16
(4.09***)
Judicial independence (Fraser) -2.16
(2.23**)
Impartial courts (Fraser) -2.22
(2.37**)
Integrety of Legal System (Fraser) -1.64
(2.67***)
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.49 0.58 0.50 0.5
Observations 118 118 57 103 103
F-test (Prob>F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Normality test (Prob>chi2) 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01
Heteroscedasticity test (Prob>chi2) 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.02
RESET (Prob>F) 0.62 0.58 0.65 0.44 0.12  
 
Notes: OLS regressions; robust absolute t-statistics in parentheses. 
* denotes significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
Higher values represent more corruption (ICRG) and better quality (World Bank, Fraser). 
Constant included but not reported. 
 
 
  30Table A-4: Determinants of Corruption – Tax Burden 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Shadow Economy 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
(1.35) (1.43) (1.77*) (2.32**) (1.65) (1.98**)
Log GDP per capita -0.42 -0.39 -0.31 -0.23 -0.44 -0.40
(5.66***) (4.02***) (2.99***) (2.79***) (4.03***) (3.43***)
Fiscal Burden (Heritage) -0.34
(2.32**)
Top marginal income tax rate (Fraser) 0.03
(0.95)
Taxes on international trade (Fraser) -0.06
(0.80)
Trade Barriers (Heritage) 0.24
(2.85***)
Taxes (percent of GDP) -0.05
(0.42)
Revenue (percent of GDP) 0.02
(1.23)
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.25 0.38 0.32
Observations 118 95 103 118 57 59
F-test (Prob>F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Normality test (Prob>chi2) 0.35 0.19 0.33 0.15 0.18 0.24
Heteroscedasticity test (Prob>chi2) 0.15 0.47 0.71 0.53 0.68 0.33
RESET (Prob>F) 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00  
 
Notes: OLS regressions; robust absolute t-statistics in parentheses. 
* denotes significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
Higher values represent more corruption (ICRG), higher burden (Heritage) and smaller burden (Fraser). 
Constant included but not reported. 
 
  31Table A-5: Determinants of Corruption – Measures of Regulation 
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )
Shadow Economy -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
(2.40**) (0.81) (2.00**) (1.44) (1.76*) (2.25**) (1.97**)
Log GDP per capita -0.20 -0.62 -0.24 -0.42 -0.34 -0.28 -0.23
(2.09**) (5.71***) (2.57**) (4.10***) (3.34***) (3.36***) (2.43**)
Credit Market Regulations (Fraser) -0.21
(2.51**)
Minimum Wage Regulation (Fraser) -0.01
(0.07)
Regulation of Prices (Fraser) -0.20
(3.22***)
Administrative Procedures (Fraser) -0.07
(0.60)
Time with government bureaucracy (Fraser) 0.26
(0.26)




Adjusted R2 0.41 0.38 0.25 0.50 0.32 0.40 0.32
Observations 103 70 103 88 88 118 118
F-test (Prob>F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Normality test (Prob>chi2) 0.88 0.16 0.75 0.60 0.39 0.39 0.51
Heteroscedasticity test (Prob>chi2) 0.29 0.17 0.17 0.42 0.32 0.50 0.04
RESET (Prob>F) 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.01  
 
Notes: OLS regressions; robust absolute t-statistics in parentheses. 
* denotes significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
Higher values represent more corruption (ICRG), more regulation (Heritage) and less regulation (Fraser). 
Constant included but not reported. 
 
  32Table A-6: Determinants of Corruption – Institutional Quality  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Shadow Economy -0.003 -0.002 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.46) (0.21) (0.46) (0.69) (0.89)
Log GDP per capita 0.003 -0.02 -0.35 -0.26 -0.27
(0.04) (0.17) (4.21***) (2.96***) (2.97***)
Rule of Law (World Bank) -0.86
(5.54***)
Government Effectiveness (World Bank) -0.82
(5.09***)
Judicial independence (Fraser) -0.17
(3.82***)
Impartial courts (Fraser) -0.19
(3.12***)
Integrety of Legal System (Fraser) -0.14
(3.18***)
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.49 0.55 0.42 0.41
Observations 118 118 88 103 103
F-test (Prob>F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Normality test (Prob>chi2) 0.48 0.20 0.77 0.46 0.91
Heteroscedasticity test (Prob>chi2) 0.71 0.41 0.78 0.61 0.95
RESET (Prob>F) 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00  
 
Notes: OLS regressions; robust absolute t-statistics in parentheses. 
* denotes significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
Higher values represent more corruption (ICRG) and better quality (World Bank, Fraser). 
Constant included but not reported. 
 
  33Appendix B: Sources and Definitions 
Variable Description Source
Shadow Economy Size of the shadow economy in percent of GDP calculated 
with dymimic and currency demand estimation techniques. 
Schneider (2005a)
Corruption (ICRG) Measures corruption in the political system as a threat to 
foreign investment based on the analysis of a worldwide 
network of experts. Rescaled so that 0 represents no 
corruption and 6 highest corruption.
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG)
Corruption (TI) Corruption Perception Index. Rescaled so that 0 represents 
no corruption and 10 highest corruption.
Transparency International
Corruption (World Bank) Control of Corruption Index.  Kaufman et al. (2003)
Corruption (DKM) Index infered from a structural model using both the likely 
causes and likely effects of corruption. The index ranges 
from 1 to 10, where higher values represent more 
corruption.
Dreher, Kotsogiannis and 
McCorriston (2005b)
GDP per capita GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by 
midyear population. Data are in constant U.S. dollars.
World Bank (2003)
Fiscal burden (Heritage) The index of the fiscal burden refers to average and 
marginal corporate and income taxation where a score of 1 
signifies an economic environment most conducive to 
economic freedom, while a score of 5 signifies least 
economic freedom.
Heritage (2005)
Top marginal income tax 
rate (Fraser)
Show higher scores for countries with lower tax rates, on a 
scale of 1-10.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Taxes on international 
trade (Fraser)
Show higher scores for countries with lower tax rates, on a 
scale of 1-10.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Trade barriers (Heritage) Captures international trade taxation and regulation. A 
higher score implies a higher burden of taxation, i.e. higher 
average and marginal tax rates and, respectively, higher 
taxes on trade.
Heritage (2005)
Taxes (percent of GDP) Tax revenue in percent of GDP. World Bank (2003)
Revenue (percent of 
GDP)
Current revenue (excluding grants) in percent of GDP. World Bank (2003)
Credit Market Regulation 
(Fraser)
Show higher scores for countries with less regulation, on a 
scale of 1-10.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Minimum Wage 
Regulation (Fraser)
Show higher scores for countries with less regulation, on a 
scale of 1-10.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Credit Market Regulation 
(Fraser)
Show higher scores for countries with less regulation, on a 
scale of 1-10.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Regulation of prices 
(Fraser)
Show higher scores for countries with less regulation, on a 
scale of 1-10.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Administrative procedures 
(Fraser)
Show higher scores for countries with fewer procedures, on 
a scale of 1-10.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Time with government 
bureaucracy (Fraser)
Show higher scores for countries with less bureaucracy, on 
a scale of 1-10.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Wage and price regulation 
(Heritage)
Index of wage and price regulation where a score of 1 
signifies an economic environment most conducive to 
economic freedom, while a score of 5 signifies least 
economic freedom.
Heritage (2005)
Regulation (Heritage) Index of regulation where a score of 1 signifies an 
economic environment most conducive to economic 
freedom, while a score of 5 signifies least economic 
Heritage (2005)
Rule of law (World Bank) Ranges from -2.58 to 2.48, with higher scores showing 
“better” environments.
Kaufmann et al. (2003)
 





Ranges -2.31 to 2.22, with higher scores showing “better” 
environments.
Kaufmann et al. (2003)
Judicial independence 
(Fraser)
Show higher scores for countries with greater judicial 
independence, on a scale of 1-10.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Impartial courts (Fraser) Show higher scores for countries with greater impartiality, 
on a scale of 1-10.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Integrity of legal system 
(Fraser)
Show higher scores for countries with higher integrity, on a 
scale of 1-10.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Ethnolinguistic  
    fractionalization
Fractionalizationj=, 
with sij being the share of group i in country j.
Alesina et al. (2003)
Latitude Absolute value of latitude. Easterly and Sewadeh (2001)
Legal origin Dummies representing French, German, Socialist, and 
Scandinavian legal origin.
La Porta et al. (1999)
Costs to start business Measures the costs of the start-up of commercial or 
industrial firms with up to 50 employees and start-up 
capital of 10 times the economy's per-capita Gross National 
Income. All procedures required to register a firm are 
counted, including screening procedures by overseeing 
government entities, tax- and labour-related registration 
procedures, health and safety procedures, and environment-
related procedures. The costs of these procedures are 
calculated as percentage of income per capita. 
Djankov et al. (2002)
Duration to start business Measures the duration of the start-up of commercial or 
industrial firms with up to 50 employees and start-up 
capital of 10 times the economy's per-capita Gross National 
Income. All procedures required to register a firm are 
counted, including screening procedures by overseeing 
government entities, tax- and labour-related registration 
procedures, health and safety procedures, and environment-
related procedures. Time is recorded in calendar days. 
Djankov et al. (2002)
Hiring flexibility index The hiring cost indicator measures all social security 
payments (including retirement fund; sickness, maternity 
and health insurance; workplace injury; family allowance; 
and other obligatory contributions) and payroll taxes 
associated with hiring an employee. The cost is expressed 
as a percentage of the worker’s salary. 
Botero et al. (2004)
Firing flexibility index The firing cost indicator measures the cost of advance 
notice requirements, severance payments and penalties due 
when dismissing a redundant worker, expressed in weekly 
wages. 
Botero et al. (2004)
Religious 
   fractionalization
Fractionalizationj=, 
with sij being the share of group i in country j.
















  35Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation
Shadow Economy 31.78 6.90 68.20 12.72
Corruption (ICRG) 3.26 0.00 6.00 1.32
Corruption (TI) 5.20 0.00 9.95 2.61
Corruption (World Bank) 0.00 -1.85 2.58 0.98
Corruption (DKM) 0.08 -0.91 0.35 0.29
GDP per capita 7.50 3.98 10.72 1.55
Fiscal burden (Heritage) 3.82 1.30 5.00 0.75
Top marginal income tax rate (Fraser) 4.95 0.00 10.00 3.01
Taxes on international trade (Fraser) 6.44 0.00 10.00 2.34
Trade barriers (Heritage) 3.55 1.00 5.00 1.22
Taxes (percent of GDP) 20.20 0.37 47.28 9.69
Revenue (percent of GDP) 24.63 0.04 58.76 10.48
Credit Market Regulation (Fraser) 6.27 0.00 10.00 2.46
Minimum Wage Regulation (Fraser) 4.65 1.80 8.30 1.35
Credit Market Regulation (Fraser) 5.76 0.35 9.80 2.35
Regulation of prices (Fraser) 4.30 0.00 10.00 2.65
Administrative procedures (Fraser) 4.10 1.30 7.33 1.11
Time with government bureaucracy (Fraser) 6.10 2.20 9.70 1.32
Wage and price regulation (Heritage) 2.86 1.00 5.00 0.87
Regulation (Heritage) 3.37 1.00 5.00 0.93
Rule of law (World Bank) 0.00 -2.04 2.36 0.98
Government effectiveness (World Bank) -0.02 -2.28 2.59 0.95
Judicial independence (Fraser) 5.76 0.35 9.80 2.34
Impartial courts (Fraser) 5.49 0.00 9.50 1.85
Integrity of legal system (Fraser) 6.52 0.00 10.00 2.59
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 0.44 0.00 0.93 0.26
Latitude 17.89 -36.89 64.22 23.77
Legal origin British 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.48
Legal origin French 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.50
Legal origin Socialist 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.37
Legal origin German 0.03 0.00 1.00 0.16
Legal origin Scandinavian 0.03 0.00 1.00 0.16
Costs to start business 79.90 0.00 861.30 134.67
Duration to start business 54.60 2.00 203.00 40.15
Hiring flexibility index 49.30 17.00 81.00 17.09
Firing flexibility index 37.95 1.00 74.00 17.57
Religious fractionalization 0.44 0.00 0.86 0.23
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